In In re Murray, No. 05-48017, 2006 WL 2457851 (Bankr. M.D.Ga. August 22, 2006), the debtor owner of a "910 vehicle,"  argued (1)  that the creditor did not qualify for secured treatment under §1325(a)* because part of its claim included an extended warranty, document fee and title fee, in addition to the "price" of the actual vehicle; (2) The claim could be bifurcated pursuant to new §1325(a)*; and (3) the creditor was not entitled to "prime plus risk factor" mandated by the US Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004).  The court disagreed with debtor on all counts.

(1) The court, after analyzing state law (§OCGA 11-9-103, definition of "price"), common practice and meaning, the nature of the items at issue, and noting the absence of contrary authority,  found that under state law, "price" did include the items included in the purchase, and therefore, the creditor had a valid security interest covered by Section 1325(a).

(2) The court followed the reasoning of the majority of courts that have reached the issue, including  In re Brown, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 476, Case No. 05-21764 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. March 27, 2006)(Dalis), concluding —

Considering this legislative history, the grammatical structure of § 1325(a)(*), and the definitions of the terms “allowed” and “secured” found elsewhere in the Code, the Court holds that the only sound conclusion is that a claim qualifying under § 1325(a)(*) may be considered an “allowed secured claim” for purposes of § 1325 and would be, therefore, subject to the present interest requirement of § 1325(a)(5).

(3) With respect to debtor’s third alternative argument, that the creditor was not entitled to "prime plus risk factor" mandated by the US Supreme Court in Till, and that Till was abrogated by new 1325(a)* the Court held —

In other cases concerning § 1325(a)(*), creditors have made the argument that with the enactment of BAPCPA and § 1325(a)(*), Till has been abrogated. There is simply no basis for this contention. No provision of BAPCPA prohibits the modification of secured creditors’ rights under § 1322(b)(2). Had Congress intended to create an absolute safe-harbor for secured creditors holding claims qualifying under § 1325(a)(*), like it provided for home mortgages under § 1322(b)(2), Congress could have done so, but it did not. Section § 1325(a)(*) neither addresses the issue of interest nor prohibits the modification of claims qualifying under that section. Section 1325(a)(*) only says that § 506 is not available to bifurcate secured claims qualifying under that section. BAPCPA did not amend § 1322(b)(2) with its grant of leeway to amend; therefore, the right to do so still exists. Further, there is no mention of interest or of Till in any of the legislative history of the amendments to § 1325. Clearly, therefore, Till, with its mandate regarding the payment of post-petition interest, is not abrogated. Secured claims qualifying under § 1325(a)(*) shall be paid at the interest rate set forth in Till so as to satisfy the present value requirement of § 1325(a)(5).