One of the uncertainties created by the BAPCPA in consumer cases is whether the surrender of a "910 vehicle" is full satisfaction of the debt, even if the sale of the collateral brings less than the debt.
The "hanging paragraph" after 11 USC §1325(a)(9), added by the BAPCPA, provides the following –
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
The majority view to this point is that the surrender of a "910 vehicle" extinguishes the entire claim, and no deficiency remains. The minority view has been that the creditor still retains an unsecured deficiency under state law, and its rights are unmodified by § 506. See Dupaco Comm. Credit Union v. Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675 (W.D. Wis. 2006); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).
The Northern District of Georgia will apparently follow the minority view, as reflected in the recent orders by Judge Bonapfel and Judge Diehl —
In re Davis (Bonapfel)
In re Barton (Bonapfel)
In re Silvers; In re Slocum (Diehl)