The Split Circuits Blog discusses the case of In re Moore, — B.R. —-, 2006 WL 3692640 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn. Dec. 14, 2006), wherein the issue was the validity of credit counseling done the day of filing.

Resolution of the motions to dismiss turns on the interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1), which was enacted by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 106, 119 Stat. 23, 37. This provision states in part:

[A]n individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.

The court, noting the split of authority, held that counseling received the same day was valid

[T]he "180-day" phrase must be read in context with the clause that proceeds it: "an individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day …." This language is instructive because it reminds us that this is an eligibility provision, just like other eligibility requirements in § 109 of the Bankruptcy Code, defining who is eligible for bankruptcy relief. Eligibility is determined as of the filing of the petition. See, e.g., In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd, 251 B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr.D.Del.2000) ("The test for eligibility is as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed."). . . .

Thus, considered in its context of § 109‘s eligibility requirements, the more likely plain meaning of "date" as used in § 109(h)(1) appears to be the less common, but still often used definition, that of moment or specific time. . . . Similarly, the now infamous "hanging paragraph" at the end of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) refers to debts "incurred within the 910-day [period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition." . . .

Furthermore, although this court believes that the appropriate reading of § 109(h)(1) is ascertainable from both its language and context, the sparse legislative history to the provision also supports the determination that rather than mandating an artificial time frame period during which credit counseling must occur, Congress’ focus in § 109(h)(1) was on imposing a new eligibility requirement which must be satisfied at the bankruptcy filing deadline.